Events & Speeches

Speech by Special Guest, Professor Tommy Koh, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs at SMC’s 10th Anniversary Luncheon
"International Mediation: The Experience of an UN Special Envoy"

17 August 2007, Four Seasons Hotel

Introduction

1 In 1992, the then UN Secretary-General, Dr Boutros Boutros‑Ghali, had approved of the manner in which I had managed and chaired the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. He asked me to join his cabinet in New York and to take charge of all matters relating to environment and sustainable development. I declined on the ground that I saw a conflict of interest in going from chairing the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) to taking on a position on the issues covered by the Conference, in the UN Secretariat. He told me that he did not see any conflict of interest.

2 A few months later, Dr Boutros-Ghali called me and requested me to accept appointment as his Special Envoy to undertake a “mission impossible”. I told the Secretary-General that the chances of success were very slim but would be enhanced if I had the unanimous support of the five permanent members of the Security Council. I requested him to inform them of his intention to appoint me and to get their backing. Dr Boutros-Ghali refused to do so on the ground that the resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly had empowered him to make the appointment without consulting the Security Council. I respected his position but declined the appointment.

3 In the summer of 1993, I received another call from Dr Boutros-Ghali requesting me to accept appointment as his Special Envoy to Russia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. I decided not to rebuff him for the third time but confessed to him that I had never been to the four countries. In a humourous response, he said, “That’s good. You will go with an open mind and carry no baggage from the past”. When my appointment was reported in The Straits Times, several of my wife’s friends called her to express concern for my safety. They had, understandably, confused the Baltics with the Balkans!

The Historical Background

The three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are, like Singapore, relatively small countries. Estonia has a population of 1.3 million. Its beautiful capital is called Tallinn. Its neighbours are Russia to the east, Latvia to the south and Sweden to the west. It lies opposite Finland, with which it shares commonalties of language and culture. Estonia existed as an independent country from 1918 to 1939 and since 1991. Estonia was occupied by Soviet Union in 1940 and Nazi Germany from 1941 to 1944 and lost its independence when Stalin incorporated it into the Soviet Union in the fall of 1944. In 1993, there were between 5,000 and 6,000 Russian troops and about 50,000 Russian veterans and retirees in Estonia. There was also a Russian nuclear submarine training centre in Paldiski which had been closed but had to be carefully dismantled and removed.

Latvia

4 Latvia has a population of 2.2 million and its beautiful capital is called Riga. It is located between Estonia in the north, Russia to the east, Lithuania to the south and Belarus to the southeast. It was an independent country from 1918 to 1939. It was occupied by Nazi Germany from 1941 to 1944 and also lost its independence when it was incorporated into the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War. In 1993, there were 18,000 Russian troops and about 20,000 Russian pensioners and their families in Latvia. In addition, Russia had a naval base in Liepaja, an anti-ballistic missile early warning system in Skrunda and a facility in Venspils to monitor space objects (Russian version) or to eavesdrop on communications in Northern Europe (Latvian version).

Lithuania

5 Lithuania has a population of 3.5 million and its historic capital is called Vilnius. It is located between Latvia to the north, the Baltic Sea to the west and Poland to the south. Russia enjoys sovereignty over a corridor passing through Lithuanian territory to the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Lithuania was the luckiest of the three Baltic States and suffered the least harm and damage from Stalin. Estonia and Latvia had resisted Stalin’s unilateral decision to incorporate them into the Soviet Union. In reprisal, Stalin sent the anti-Soviet elites of the two countries into exile in Siberia. Many perished. In Lithuania, as then President Brazauskas had explained to me, they decided not to resist Stalin. Instead, they all joined the Communist Party. As a result, there were very few Russian soldiers or settlers in Lithuania.

Break-up of the Russian Empire

6 The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Russian empire was a truly historic event. A major burden for the new Russian Government was the return of the Red Army from the various Soviet republics which had become independent, and the need to build housing and to find jobs for the returnees. I saw for myself, at a military camp outside Moscow, the terrible conditions in which the troops and their families, which had returned from Lithuania, were being housed. This convinced me that the withdrawal of the Russian troops had to be phased and that there should be an international effort to help Russia build decent housing for the returnees.

The UN General Resolution 47/21 of 1992

7 On 24 August 1991, Russia agreed to restore independence to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and formally recognised their independent status on 6 September 1991. The Baltic States demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from their territories. The four governments held several rounds of talks between 1992 and 1993 on an agenda consisting of the timing for the withdrawal of the Russian troops, the welfare of the Russian populations in those countries, and questions relating to the submarine training centre in Estonia, and the three facilities in Latvia. Frustrated by the slow pace of progress, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania submitted the question to the UN General Assembly and succeeded in persuading the Assembly to adopt a resolution (47/21) which, inter alia, urged the Secretary-General to “use his good offices”. The Secretary-General appointed me to carry out his mandate.

The Office of the UN Secretary-General’s Envoy

Role of UN Special Envoy

8 The role of the Special Envoy is similar to that of an international mediator. He is not an arbitrator or a judge. A Special Envoy can only make recommendations to the parties to a dispute. It is up to them to decide whether to accept his recommendations or not. Before embarking on my mission, I spent several months reading all the books and literature I could find on the histories and cultures of the three Baltic countries and their relations with Russia, Germany and other neighbours. When I visited Moscow, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, I practised the art of deep listening. I tried my best to understand their different perspectives, their demands and their feelings and to be fair in my recommendations.

9 I enlisted the support of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the European Community, the CSCE (now called OSCE), and countries which were willing to help resolve the problem, such as, the United States, Germany and the Scandinavian countries. I tried to persuade the Russians, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians to show goodwill and flexibility towards each other. In Estonia and Latvia, where I encountered strong anti-Russia feelings, I urged them to forgive Stalin for the many atrocities he had committed against them and to look to the future. I gently reminded them that they were destined to live next door to Russia, which was weak then but would be strong again. At the end of my mission, I submitted a report to the Secretary-General which was, in turn, submitted to the UN General Assembly.

My Recommendations

Lithuania

10 I will never forget the day I arrived in Vilnius from Moscow, on 31 August 1993. I was received by the Chief of Protocol at the airport and taken to the square in front of the Parliament where I found that thousands of people had gathered to celebrate the happy day on which the last Russian combat troops had left Lithuanian territory. From the Parliament Square, I was escorted to the President’s Residence where another party was being held. When I was introduced to President Brazauskas, I congratulated him and asked him for the story. He was a big and humourous man. He was formerly the head of the Lithuanian Communist Party and a good friend of Boris Yeltsin. He said that, in anticipation of my visit, he had called Yeltsin on 30 August and persuaded him to agree to withdraw the few remaining Russian troops the next day. I was, of course, overjoyed because the problem had been solved.

Latvia

11 The situation in Latvia was more complicated. I made the following recommendations. First, on the timing for the withdrawal of Russian troops, I appealed to both sides to compromise. To the Russians, I explained that an earlier date was important to the Latvians for political and psychological reasons. To the Latvians, I pleaded for patience in order to give the Russians the time needed to build housing for the 18,000 troops and their families. Second, on the fate of the 20,000 Russian military pensioners and their families, I found out that 87 per cent of them would like to remain in Latvia and become Latvian citizens. I recommended that those who had settled in Latvia, before 4 May 1990, the date on which Latvia had declared its independence, should be granted permanent residence. As most of the pensioners were elderly, I also recommended that their housing and medicare should not be withdrawn. Third, after visiting the Russian naval base in Liepaja, I was not persuaded by Russia’s request to retain the base for an additional five to six years. Fourth, as for Skrunda and Venspils, I recommended that the two sides should negotiate agreements for Russia to lease those facilities, for an agreed period of time, so that she could replicate those facilities inside Russian territory.

Estonia

12 Estonia was the most difficult case. This was partly due to the fact that of the three countries, Estonians suffered the most under Stalin and because of the large numbers of Russian military retirees and their families, amounting to 52,000. The then President of Estonia, Mr L. Meri, explained to me that about a third of the Estonian population, including his own family, had been deported to Siberia. The recent incident, resulting from the Estonian Government’s decision to relocate a statue of a Russian soldier from the centre of the city to a less conspicuous location, is a reminder that both communities in Estonia are still haunted by the ghosts of the past. I was scolded by some members of the Estonian Parliament when I urged them to embrace the virtue of forgiveness.

13 I made the following recommendations concerning Estonia. First, on the date of the troop withdrawal, I suggested a compromise between the Estonians’ deadline of end 1993 and the Russians’ deadline of end 1994. Second, concerning the discontinued nuclear submarine training centre at Paldiski, I urged the two sides to solve the problem as a technical, not a political one. The nuclear reactors had been deactivated but the nuclear fuel rods, the nuclear waste in storage and other nuclear materials had to be taken out by rail to St Petersburg. If necessary, I suggested to the two parties to request the help of IAEA.

14 Third, the most contentious issue was the fate of the 52,000 Russian settlers who wished to remain in Estonia because they had no homes in Russia to go back to. I recommended that all those who had retired before Estonia regained its independence should be allowed to remain in Estonia and continue to enjoy their housing and medical benefits. In a meeting with representatives of the Russian Union of Veterans and Pensioners, I told them that they could no longer expect to enjoy special rights and privileges but should be treated with fairness and humanity. I also said that those Russians who wanted to become Estonian citizens must be loyal to Estonia, learn its language and respect its culture.

Success of the Mission

15 My peace mission to Russia and the Baltics was successful because I was lucky with the timing and because my efforts complemented those of several other organisations, countries and individuals. In 1993, Russia was weak and in serious economic difficulties. Yeltsin needed the help of the West and was willing to be cooperative in the Baltics. The Baltic countries had many champions apart from the UN, including the European Community, the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (now renamed as OSCE), the Council of Europe, the United States, Germany and the Scandinavian countries. Denmark, Norway and the US had provided Russia with financial assistance to help her build housing for the returning troops and their families. I must also acknowledge my thanks to the then US Ambassador in Moscow, Tom Pickering. Ambassador Pickering arranged for me to meet one of President Yeltsin’s staffers in the Kremlin, who apparently had more influence with the President than the hardliners in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence with whom I was negotiating.

Conclusion

16 My one experience of having served as an international mediator was a positive one. I am glad that I was able to make a small contribution to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and their important relations with Russia. Since 1993, the three Baltic countries have made impressive economic progress. They also feel more secure as members of the EU and NATO. I believe that there are other Singaporeans as well as other Asians who would make good international mediators. I believe that Singapore can become an international mediation centre of Asia. I hope that the Singapore Mediation Centre, which has been successful in promoting mediation as a modality for settling disputes in Singapore, would consider expanding its role to include international mediation.

17 Thank you.